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ABSTRACT 
Honeypots are computer systems deliberately designed to be attack targets, 
mainly to learn about cyber-attacks and attacker behavior. When implemented as part of a 
security posture, honeypots also protect real networks by acting as a decoy, deliberately 
confusing potential attackers as to the real data.  The objective of this research is to 
compare attack patterns against a honeypot to those against a real network, the network 
of the Naval Postgraduate School.  Collection of suspicious-event data required the 
implementation and setup of a honeypot, in addition to the installation and use of an 
intrusion-detection system. A statistical analysis was conducted across suspicious-event 
data recorded from a honeypot and from a real network.  Metrics used in our study were 
applied to the alerts generated from Snort 2.4.3, an open-source intrusion detection 
system. Results showed differences between the honeypot and the real network data 
which need further experiments to understand.  Both the honeypot and the real network 
data showed much variability at the start of the experiment period and then a decrease in 
the number of alerts in the later period of the experiment.  We conclude that after the 
initial probing and reconnaissance is complete, the vulnerabilities of the network are 
learned and therefore fewer alerts occur; but more specific signatures are then aimed at 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Cyber-attacks are a serious problem that resulted in over $130 million in losses 
according to the 2005 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey [1].  As indicated in 
their survey, virus attacks and unauthorized access led as the primary sources of financial 
loss.  An important security technology used to combat and understand these cyber-
attacks is the use of a honeypot.  A honeypot is a form of deception employed to detect or 
confuse unauthorized attempts on information systems. Honeypots have no productive 
value; therefore any interaction captured is deemed unauthorized.  This makes honeypots 
a powerful technology for gathering and understanding information on threats. 
The objective of this thesis is to distinguish attack patterns against a honeypot 
from those against other kinds of computers.  Varying the degree of deception on our 
honeypot, we conduct a statistical analysis of suspicious-event data collected from our 
high-interaction honeypot and that from data collected from our School’s internal 
network.  A high-interaction honeypot is defined as a network of computers using real 
operating systems and services, whereas a low-interaction honeypot is software installed 
that emulates different operating systems and services.  Typically, low-interaction 
honeypots have limited interactions, while high-interaction honeypots are more complex, 
therefore providing more data to be captured [2].  With these techniques we hope to 
measure the effectiveness of a honeypot by providing similarities and/or differences of 
the attack pattern under different configurations using various metrics.  In general, the 
goal of our research is to test the value of defensive deception for a computer system, and 
to describe and characterize the impact of deception when used on honeypots. 
The setup of the experiments reported here includes the installation and 
configuration of a honeypot and intrusion-detection system.  We collect and extract data 
from our honeypot and from the School’s network.  We evaluate the data collected and 
propose metrics to better analyze the suspicious-event data.  Based on these metrics, we 
model trends and compare them between the honeypot and the School's internal network.  
Metrics used in our study derive from alerts generated from Snort, an open-source 
intrusion-detection system.  An intrusion-detection system is hardware and/or software 
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that are used to detect inappropriate or suspicious activity.  Specifically, Snort produces 
alerts by identifying signatures of suspicious traffic. 
The purposes of a honeypot are for production or for research [2].  When used for 
production purposes, honeypots help prevent and detect attacks for those organizations as 
part of their defense posture.  The purpose of our study is for research.  We are not 
interested in capturing information on new tools or analyzing the communication method 
of the attacker but rather on the patterns of the suspicious-event data.  We want to 
understand the effectiveness and weaknesses of honeypots.  In addition, we want to find 
good metrics so that the massive amount of data is filtered so it can be effectively and 
systematically analyzed and correlated.   
The background of the key tools of the thesis such as honeypots and intrusion-
detection systems along with the survey of related work is described in Chapter II.  
Chapter III details the testbed setup, configuration, and rationale of the honeypot 
including hardware, software and network details.  In addition, a brief description of the 
School's network is provided, including specification of its hardware and network 
configuration.  The data analysis is described in Chapter IV.  Chapter V provides 
conclusions and suggestions for future work.  Appendix A details startup instructions of 
the honeypot, database, and intrusion-detection system.  Appendix B details additional 
options and necessary files of the lab experiment.  Appendix C provides additional graphs 
used in the data analysis of the honeypot. 
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II. BACKGROUND  
This chapter provides background related to our study.  The first section is a 
history and overview of honeypots and their use as a decoy system or a form of 
deception.  The second section is an introduction to intrusion-detection systems and the 
use and inner workings of Snort, the one we used.  The third section is a survey of related 
work in the area of honeypot effectiveness. 
A. HONEYPOTS 
The concept of honeypots has been around since before the invention of 
computers.  This concept involves a decoy computer system for which interactions are 
solicited.  The honeypot owner's purpose is to observe this interaction in hopes of gaining 
a better understanding of those entities interacting with the deception.  In the context of 
the cyber world, we define a honeypot as “an information system resource whose value 
lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource." [2]    
The popularity of honeypots has greatly increased over the last few years. The 
concept first surfaced in 1989 in Cliff Stoll’s “The Cuckoo’s Egg”.  It was not until the 
formation of the Honeynet Project in October 1999 that the concept was better 
formulated and organized as a way to learn more about the "blackhat" community, their 
tools, and their techniques.  (A "blackhat" is a malicious person or hacker who 
compromises the security of the system to gain unauthorized access to the computer 
and/or network [3].)  Founding members of the Honeynet Project were Marty Roesch, 
Chris Brenton, J.D. Glazer, Ed Skoudis and Lance Spitzner.  They would learn about 
hackers through honeypots or honeynets and share the knowledge through their website 
and publications.  In just a few years, interest in learning about the blackhat community 
greatly increased.  With the explosion of technology, computer use, and the need for 
better security measures, the Honeynet Project would eventually reach its limit.  Enter the 
Honeynet Research Alliance in January 2002, which consists of different organizations 
across the world facilitating the learning and sharing of knowledge through the 
deployment of honeynets.       
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The main kinds are low-interaction honeypots and high-interaction honeypots.  
Low-interaction honeypots, or shallow decoys, emulate services [2, 4].   They are 
typically easier to deploy than high-interaction honeypots, require less administrative 
expertise, and less resources.  Both an advantage and disadvantage of a low-interaction 
honeypot is that it limits the amount of interaction; while this minimizes the risk of what 
an attacker can do, it also limits the amount of data that is collected.  In addition, low-
interaction honeypots “cannot properly mimic the response of real services or determine 
activity after a compromise”[4]. High-interaction honeypots, on the other hand, are 
deployed with real operating systems and actual services.  They can generate an extensive 
amount of data.  Observing attackers exploiting services and operating system 
vulnerabilities, we discover new tools used, learn about motives, and capture unexpected 
behavior [2].  The disadvantage to high-interaction honeypots is the added level of 
complexity and risk.  They require more setup time, more monitoring time, more 
administrative expertise, and more resources to build and configure the specified 
operating system and services.  Note that to prevent discovery of both kinds of honeypots 
by attackers during reconnaissance, deception is crucial.  This could mean writing more 
elaborate scripts for low-interaction honeypots or customizing high-interactions 
honeypots. We used a high-interaction honeypot in the experiments reported in this 
thesis. 
The risk of using a high-interaction honeypot can be significant.  Potentially, an 
unmonitored honeypot can foster criminal activity by allowing storage and/or distribution 
of illegal materials, such as stolen credit card account numbers.  Compromised honeypots 
can also launch attacks on real computers or networks.  Therefore there are two criteria to 
minimize risk and maximize success: data control and data capture [2]. Data control 
involves restricting malicious activity to the perimeter of the honeypot; this can be done 
by limiting the outbound connections.  Data capture involves monitoring and logging all 
interactions.  By doing so, criminal activity can be prevented if noticed early enough by 
disabling the honeypot when suspect activities, such as increased inbound/outbound 
connections or transfer of files, occur; but this takes effort, time and expertise.  Real-time 
monitoring and analysis of the captured data is itself an intensive and laborious task and 
must not be taken lightly.  In addition, there must be careful consideration as to where 
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and how the data is logged.  Logging the data locally increases the risk of detection or 
worse tampering or corruption of the captured data.  “Captured data must be logged and 
stored on a separate, secured system.”[2].  
Honeypots have several other uses besides monitoring attackers. They serve to 
protect real networks and their data by acting as a decoy, deliberately confusing potential 
attackers.  A special kind of honeypot called a "sticky honeypot" aids in slowing down 
attackers or automated worms.  Honeypots also allow security administrators to discover 
and remedy weaknesses in the software and configuration of a host or network.  Their 
flexibility fits the dynamic nature of the cyber world. 
B. INTRUSION-DETECTION SYSTEMS 
An intrusion-detection system (IDS) is software that detects inappropriate or 
suspicious activity on a computer or network.  Intrusion is defined as any unauthorized 
access to a network, computer or file.  In addition to intrusion however, misuse  
(inappropriate activity) should be detected and logged by an IDS.  We further identify 
three types of IDSs: host-based, network-based, and distributed.  A host-based IDS 
resides on a single computer and protects just that computer; it monitors the operating 
system and detects modifications to files residing on the host system.  A network-based 
IDS can monitor more than one computer and is placed in a network; its "sensors" 
examine packets as they transit the network.  This is done by typically setting the 
Network Interface Card of a dedicated computer on the network to "promiscuous mode".  
The third type of IDS is a distributed IDS, which can combine both host-based IDSs and 
network-based IDSs; suspicious events from a set of IDSs are reported to a central 
database system [5].  Our testbed employed a centralized network-based IDS.  
IDSs are further distinguished by how the inappropriate activity is detected.  The 
two approaches are anomaly-based and signature-based (or rule-based) detection.  
Anomaly detection characterizes normal behavior and develops a profile of what is 
"normal"; suspicious activities are deviations from this profile.  An example anomaly-
based IDS is Stealth Watch [6].  Signature-based detection, uses a knowledge base of 
specific data (often bit strings) characteristic of previously identified attacks.    Detection 
of suspicious activities occurs when a known signature and a packet match.  An example 
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of a signature-based IDS is Snort, although it contains some anomaly-based detection 
features.  For our testbed, we deployed Snort version 2.4.3. 
1. Snort 2.4.3 
Snort® is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection 
system utilizing a rule-driven language, which combines the benefits of 
signature, protocol and anomaly based inspection methods. With millions 
of downloads to date, Snort is the most widely deployed intrusion-
detection and prevention technology worldwide and has become the de 
facto standard for the industry.[7] 
Snort is the default standard for intrusion detection. We also deployed it because 
we desired a similar data format to that obtained from the Network Security Group of the 
Naval Postgraduate School.  They use Snort to monitor the school’s network and 
graciously offered samples of their data and Snort rules for our research. 
a. Inner Workings of Snort 2.4.3 
We briefly discuss the Snort architecture and how attacks are detected.  
An important requirement of running Snort is the libpcap library for Linux systems or 
WinPcap for Windows systems; this library does packet capture.  Figure 1 is a high-level 
outline of the Snort architecture in relation to the TCP/IP Model.   
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Figure 1.   Snort Architecture 
 
The layer at which the packets are passed from host to host is at the 
datalink layer.  The packet-capture library reads the packets at this point so that the Snort 
engine can decode, detect, and alert as necessary.  Once the libpcap/WinPcap captures a 
packet, the following occurs [5]: 
1) The Packet decode engine decodes the packet based on the link 
layer protocol (e.g.  Ethernet, Token Ring, or PPP). 
2) The Preprocessor plug-ins handle the packets after the decoder 
has parsed them, by reassembling packets, decoding protocols, and 
doing anomaly-based detection. 
3) The Detection Engine is where packets are matched to rules to 
detect suspicious behavior.  By using a multi-pattern search 
algorithm, the detection engine checks multiple rules in parallel. 
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4) Detection plug-ins implements specialized tests. 
5) Finally, if alerts are generated, then the Output plug-in is called.  
This allows for various formatting and presentation of these alerts.  
Supported plug-in formats include UNIX syslogs, XML-formatted 
logs, and logging to relational databases such as Oracle, MySQL, 
or PostgreSQL. 
Figure 2 shows an incoming packet and the process involved before and 
after the Snort engine detects the suspicious-event data. The rule shown is designed to 
catch a UDP bomb attack.  The alert is triggered when the detection engine matches UDP 
packets going from any source IP address to any destination IP address, from port 19 to 
port 7 [5].  
     
              
Figure 2.   Snort Process of Detecting Suspicious Data 
 
The rule set ("knowledge base") used by Snort in examining packets is 
stored in a directory of text files.  Each text file is a ruleset; each ruleset contains a list of 
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rules similar to that of the UDP bomb attack.  It is important that one frequently update 
the rules so that new attacks are captured and properly alerted.  The default Snort package 
includes a rulebase with the rulesets shown in Table 1. 



















Table 1. Default Ruleset for Snort 2.4.3 
 
Rules can also be downloaded from the Snort website at www.snort.org 
from the Sourcefire Vulnerability Research Team (VRT).  Unregistered users can obtain 
a static ruleset at the time of a major Snort Release.  Registered users can download rules 
five days after a release to the subscription users.  Subscribers can download real-time 
rules as soon as they are available.  However, subscribers pay a fee of $195/month or 
$495/quarter or $1795/year.  In addition, Snort provides administrators with the 
flexibility and ease of creating their own rules.   
C. SURVEY OF RELATED WORK 
1. Effectiveness of Honeypots 
Some have defined the effectiveness of a honeypot by two measures: the ability to 
deceive and the ability to solicit attacks.  In [4] the authors compare the effectiveness of 
two low-interaction honeypots, Deception Toolkit (DTK) and Honeyd.  They measure the 
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effectiveness of the deception by determining the difference between the behavior of the 
honeypot to the behavior of real services.  The effectiveness of the solicitation is 
measured by the number of unique responses that are solicited from the attacking 
program.  A lab was setup to perform a series of anomaly scripts and known attacks.  The 
known attacks included different types of malware.  Automated scanners and auto-rooters 
were examples of a ‘Category III’ attack used in the experiment.  A paradox occurred in 
the results of the experiment.  Although the low-interaction honeypots did not deceive 
well according to their tests, they did however receive more attacks from automated 
scanners and auto-rooters than real systems did.  This is an important conclusion. Many 
systems attract common script kiddies or automated worms, botnets, and auto-rooters [8].  
The ability to solicit attacks aids the effectiveness of honeypots as it increases the amount 
of data that is collected.  We also conclude that the type of traffic that honeypots receive 
can depend on the type of deployment, i.e. low-interaction vs. high-interaction. Although, 
both low-interaction and high-interaction honeypots are effective in soliciting attacks, 
high-interaction honeypots have a better potential of improving the effectiveness of 
deception.  In high-interaction honeypots, we are not emulating services but in fact, 
implementing real services.  The only limitation is in our own ability to properly and 
creatively configure and deploy such systems.  As such, there is this opportunity and if 
done properly increases the chance of soliciting attacker activity in addition to the 
automated worms and botnets.  
One of the most active research groups contributing to the technology of 
honeypots is The Honeynet Project [9].  This project has grown into a community of 
organizations dedicated to learning about attacks, tools, and attacker motives.  But as the 
honeynet technology advances, so do attackers’ abilities.  In a counterfeit issue of an 
online hacker periodical, one of the Honeynet Project’s data-capture tools, Sebek was 
criticized.  Although the periodical was a hoax, some noteworthy points are made, such 
as that honeynet technology can be detected. In a rebuttal article [10] the author points 
out that honeynet technology is continually improved with the advancement of 
countermeasures by hackers, since there are counter-countermeasures.  In regards to 
detection, “the action of checking for a honeypot can give a detectable signature, leading 
to new, more specific techniques for detection”[10].  
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III. TESTBED SETUP, CONFIGURATION, AND RATIONALE  
This chapter details the hardware, software and layout of the honeypot network 
("honeynet") used in collecting data, and the problems encountered in setting up the 
experiment.  Also discussed is the general layout and configuration of the School’s 
network. 
A. EXPERIMENT SPECIFICATION  
We deployed a high-interaction honeypot, setting up a small network of 
computers.  An IP address was registered from SBC Internet Services so that direct 
connection to the Internet was possible. 
1. Hardware Specification 
Three computers were provided in the experiment and were networked together 
via crossover cable.  The other computers, as indicated in Figure 3, were virtual 
computers implemented inside one specific computer running special software.  Each 
computer was specifically tasked and labeled.  The resulting network comprised of the 
Router, the Honeypot, and the Data-Capture computers.  The Router’s purpose was to act 
as the portal from the outside world to the Honeypot while collecting data.  Therefore we 
installed three network interface cards (NICs).  The NIC connecting to the Internet was 
set to promiscuous mode so that packets could be sniffed.  The remaining two NICs 
connected the other machines.  One NIC was designated to the Honeypot, while the other 
transferred data to the Data-Capture machine.  The Honeypot machine served as the 
sacrificial information resource which solicited attacks.  The deployment of the Honeypot 
included running a virtual network of two computers with various services.  The Data-
Capture computer served to log and to store the captured data.  The hardware 
specifications of each system are listed in Table 2. 
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Router
(Dell Dimension XPS B933)
Processor Intel Pentium III - 933Mhz
Storage Maxtor (Ultra ATA) - 20.4GB
Memory 512 MB
NIC Davicom Semiconductor 21x4x DEC Tulip- Compatible 10/100Mbps
3Com 3C905C-TX Fast EtherLink 10/100Mbps
3Com 3C90SC-TX Fast EtherLink 10/100Mbps
Drives DVD-Rom, CD-RW, Zip, Floppy
Honeypot
(Dell OptiPlex GX520)
Processor Intel Pentium 4 - 2.80GHz
Storage (Serial ATA) - 40GB
Memory 1024 MB




Processor Intel Pentium 4 - 1.80GHz
Storage Western Digital (Ultra ATA) - 40GB
Maxtor (Ultra ATA) - 40GB
Memory 256 MB
NIC EthernExpress Pro/100 VE (integrated)
Drives CD-RW, Floppy  
Table 2. Experiment Hardware Specification 
 
2. Software Specification 
SUSE Linux 10 was installed on each computer.  Other software was added in 
accordance to the task of each computer.  Installed on the Router machine is the 
intrusion-detection system, Snort 2.4.3, Apache Webserver, and Basic Analysis and 
Security Engine (BASE).  The intrusion-detection system or Snort sensor serves to sniff 
inbound and outbound traffic to the honeypot and to send any captured data to the Data-
Capture machine.  Apache Webserver is an open-source Web server needed to run 
BASE.  BASE is an application that provides a web front-end to query and analyze the 
alerts coming from Snort.  Installed on the Honeypot box was VMware Workstation 5.5.  
VMware is a commercial software that allows for the creation and execution of multiple 
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operating systems simultaneously on a single physical machine [11].    Using VMware 
allowed for the option of growing our network into a more extensive honeynet.  Since we 
were limited to one machine, VMware allowed us to do so, simulating two additional 
operating systems.   
The initial environment on the Honeypot had one guest operating system installed 
on the VMware, Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server with Service Pack 4, the 
most recent Service Pack.  We opted to use Service Pack 4 because we realized that 
Service Pack 1 was too vulnerable to autonomous agents such as bots and worms.  We 
wanted our high-interaction honeypot to appear more like a legitimate network on which 
system administrators would install the latest service patch and updates.  We also 
installed a Windows XP Professional with Service Pack 2, upgrading our honeypot to a 
honeynet.  Services running on Windows 2000 Server included Internet Information 
Service (IIS) 5.0, FTP and Telnet.  Internet Information Services is Microsoft’s Web 
server application which provides users with a manageable and scalable Web application 
infrastructure [12]. Our setup contained a simple Web page consisting of photographs.  In 
addition, we added a shared folder and placed text files and word documents inside.  One 
group and two users were added to each of the Windows machine.  We also installed 
AOL Instant Messenger (AIM), is a free instant messaging service on our Windows XP 
machine.  We setup an account and configured AIM to start at boot-up.  
The Data-Capture box was purposely segregated on a separate subnet than that of 
the Honeypot.  Information obtained from the Router was directed to the Data-Capture 
box and stored on a database.  We used PostgreSQL 8.1.1, an open-source relational 
database system.  Rather than log alerts into files, we anticipated a high volume of traffic 
and therefore wanted the ability to easily access and view in real time the captured data.  
Using a database provided us with the categorization and querying benefits needed to 
efficiently filter the output to suit our needs.  By using the database plug-in made 
available by the Snort intrusion-detection system, alerts are quickly “sorted, searched and 
prioritized in an organized manner” [13].  Presented in Figure 3 is an overview of the 
database structure and their relationships.  Most tables include just the primary-keys field.  
There are additional fields not shown for each table. 
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Figure 3.   Snort Database Structure [13] 
 
The event table is the main focus of the database structure.  It represents the meta-
data of all detected alerts captured from our Router to and from our Honeypot machine.  
The signature and sig_class tables are also important in determining the type of 
signatures and classifications of each alert. 
The software specifications of each system are listed in Table 3. 
Router - SUSE Linux 10
Primary Goal sniff traffic, send capture data to Data-Capture machine
Software Snort 2.4.3 - (intrusion-detection system)
Basic Analysis and Security Engine (BASE) - (web front-end to 
query and analyze the alerts coming from a Snort)
Apache - (webserver)  
Honeypot - SUSE Linux 10
Primary Goal honeypot, solicit attacks
VMWARE Workstation 5.5 running 
                    Windows 2000 Advanced Server with SP4 and 
                    Windows XP Professional with SP2
Data-Capture - SUSE Linux 10
Primary Goal store Snort data
PostgreSQL 8.1.1 - (database)  
Table 3. Experiment Software Specification 
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3. Network Configuration 
The Naval Postgraduate School provided an Internet connection outside the 
School’s firewall.  By putting our network outside the firewall, we hope to see more 
attacks while protecting the School's internal network.  The Router machine contains 
three NICs.  One NIC is connected to the Internet.  The second NIC connects from the 
Router to the Honeypot machine.  The third NIC connects to the Data-Capture machine. 
The Honeypot and Data-Capture machines are on separate subnets.  The network 
configuration is presented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   Experiment Network Configuration 
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4. Problems Encountered 
Problems and issues were caused by limited resources and a lack of 
familiarization with Linux and the other applications. Much of the hardware was 
scrounged from obsolete computers retired from the computer-science and software-
engineering departments.  We were able to cull various parts such as hard drives, RAM, 
and NICs to build two functional computers.  We decided to dedicate the newer and 
fastest computer to the Honeypot because of the need to run VMware and to use the other 
computers to route and collect data.  
We also had to scrounge for software.  Our choices were between using retired 
software and shareware.  Through the generosity of the networking group of the Naval 
Postgraduate School we were able to obtain a copy of Microsoft Windows 2000 
Advanced Server.  Other software such as SUSE Linux 10, Snort 2.4.3 and PostgreSQL 
were open-source.  We had originally installed Redhat Linux 9.0 on the two older 
computers but ran into a strange error message when attempting to install this version of 
Linux onto the newest computer.  After doing some research, we discovered that the 
newer computer included a serial-ATA (SATA) hard drive that was not compatible with 
the older Linux kernels.  Online advice suggested that we use a newer Linux kernel and 
therefore we obtained a copy of SUSE Linux 10 and re-installed.  This led to our next 
problem.  We originally attempted to install VMware 5.0 onto our Honeypot but realized 
that version 5.0 was not supported on SUSE Linux 10.  Fortunately, we were able to 
upgrade to VMware 5.5 and completing the installation onto the Linux box was 
unproblematic. 
A significant part of this project was in learning to use Linux. For those trained on 
Windows where much installation and configuration is aided with GUI, Linux initially 
was intimidating.  Installation of a program was no longer double clicking an executable, 
but understanding the commands "configure", "make", and "make install".  In addition, 
Linux meant a world of dependencies and more often than not, installing a program 
meant finding, downloading, and installing several other programs or libraries.  There 
was a learning curve. 
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B. THE SCHOOL NETWORK  
The School’s network layout and specification is far more complex since it must 
support nearly 1,500 students and over 600 faculty and staff members. 
1. Hardware/Software Specification 
The NPS network serves to connect students, educators and staff both internally 
and externally to the Internet.  There are numerous hardware equipment including 
workstations, servers, and printers disbursed throughout the campus.  Most faculty and 
staff have their own workstation running various operating systems like Microsoft 
Windows and/or a UNIX variant.  In addition, the academic buildings provide students 
with laboratories running Microsoft Windows in which to complete assignments and 
research.  Various software is installed at each laboratory on each workstation.  
The School deploys two intrusion-detection systems, StealthWatch and Snort.  
We are concerned here only with the captured data from Snort.  Currently, there are two 
Snort sensors.  Sensor 1 is placed in front of the firewall, capturing all packets bound to 
the school, whether blocked or allowed by the firewall.  The other sensor is placed behind 
the firewall, monitoring internal traffic.  Sensor 2 captures all allowed inbound traffic and 
all blocked or allowed outbound traffic.  Both sensors record successful connection, 
therefore some events are logged twice.  All captured data is sent to a secure server 
running Microsoft SQL Server 2000 database.   
To obtain the School’s captured data, we created an ODBC connection.  Open 
Database Connectivity (ODBC) is an application programming interface that provides 
access to various types of databases.  The School provided our research with read-only 
access to the SQL Server database storing the Snort data.  (See section C of Appendix B 
for detail instructions on how to create an ODBC connection.) 
2. Network Configuration 
Figure 5 is an overview of the School’s network configuration.  The captured data 
provided to us by the school is from Snort sensor 1.   
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Figure 5.   School’s Network Configuration 
 
3. Problems Encountered 
At the time of our experiment setup, the NPS Network Security Group was going 
through some major changes.  The change that affected our research was the staff change 
involving the lead security engineer.  His insight and expertise was pivotal in 
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understanding the network layout and resolving most of our issues in a timely manner.  
Shortly after his departure from NPS, the server containing all the archival Snort data 
crashed.  The server was sent to a data recovery facility; three months later, we were 
informed that the data could not be recovered from the server.  The Network Security 
Group then put much effort into rebuilding the server and reinstalling and reconfiguring 
Snort. During the time of this writing, about two weeks of data was accumulated, 
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IV. DATA RESULTS AND EVALUATION  
A. HONEYPOT DATA ANALYSIS  
Collection of suspicious-event data from our honeypot was done January 29, 2006 
through March 18, 2006.  The alerts were collected daily and then accumulated on a 
week-by-week basis, starting from Sunday and ending on Saturday.  The last two weeks 
are the only period with an overlap to data of the School’s network.  The metrics used in 
our analysis is presented in Table 4. 
Metrics Used in Honeypot
Distribution of Alerts over Collection Period
Distribution of Alerts by Week
Distribution of Alerts by Hour
Distribution of Classification
Distribution of Signatures  
Table 4. Metrics Used in Honeypot Analysis 
 
1. Distribution of Alerts 
a. Alerts over Entire Collection Period 
We first show the distribution of alerts over the entire seven week 
experiment in a time plot.  Figure 6 represents all the generated alerts triggered and 
recorded by our Data-Capture machine for a given day.  The number of alerts varied 
widely, especially during the first half of the collection period with spikes on January 
31st, February 6th, and February 22nd of 8,987, 11,381, and 11,067 respectively.  In the 
latter half of the collection period the alerts appear to subside but again spike on March 
5th and March 9th, with 3,786 and 4,516 alerts respectively.  This plot provides us with a 
good sense of the volatility of the Internet and the incoming alerts, and in particular its 
non-Poisson “bursty” nature.  This unpredictability makes expressing the probability of a 
number of alerts for a fixed time unfeasible. 
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Distribution of Alerts



















































Figure 6.   Honeypot Time Plot of Distribution of Alerts 
 
b. Alerts Compared by Week 
Based on the tabulations of Table 5, we present boxplots of each week as 
shown in Figure 7.  Here, we are provided with a measure of the spread of the middle 
50% of the alerts for each week.  Easily notable are the extreme values presented in the 
boxplot.  The maximum number of alerts are the outliers for the weeks presented.  In 
addition, the interquartile ranges (IQR) of week 2 and week 4, (4,873 and 3,981 
respectively) about nearly double over the other weeks.  This is an indication of less 
consistency for those particular weeks.  Something else apparent is that the alerts seem to 
be subsiding in the latter half of the collection: From week 4 on, there are fewer alerts 
reported. Looking at the boxplot, there is a dotted line running over the spread of the 
alerts.  The distribution is skewed to the right indicating that the majority of alerts came 
in the beginning of our collection period and has lessened towards the end.  
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1/29-2/04 2/05-2/11 2/12-2/18 2/19-2/25 2/26-3/04 3/05-3/11 3/12-3/18
Week1 Week2 Week3 Week4 Week5 Week6 Week7
Q1 569 2,782 679 307 288 436 231
Minimum 419 2,357 272 250 159 331 167
Median 865 5,389 1,022 923 327 778 314
Maximum 8,987 11,381 1,950 11,067 2,758 4,516 1,118
Q3 1,353 7,655 1,362 4,288 716 2,733 438
IQR 784 4,873 683 3,981 428 2,298 207
Mean 2,016 5,714 1,046 3,061 750 1,709 419  


























Figure 7.   Honeypot Box Plot by Week 
 
c. Alerts by Hour 
Of interest are the alerts generated at specific times in the day.  In Figure 8 
we display the number of alerts generated each hour for a seven-day period for each of 
the weeks in our collection.  We notice the irregularities of the incoming alerts.  Each 
week has at least one significant spike.  In at least five of the seven weeks, there are 
spikes early in the day.  For example, in the first three weeks, spikes occurred at the 10 
and 6 o’clock hours.  With the exception of the week of Feb. 26, alerts subside in the 
latter hours of the day, which suggests that most attackers are in North America or that 
attacks from zombie computers are local.  This also suggests that the attacks are probably 
24 
not real attackers or even script kiddies.  Attacks at a constant and specified time indicate 
that they are more likely automated botnets or scanners. 






















































































































































































































































































































Figure 8.   Honeypot Alerts by Hour per Week 
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2. Distribution of Classification 
All Snort alert rules are given a classification.  Our honeypot data included 
sixteen of the classifications presented in Table 6 which are highlighted in yellow.  The 
classifications are grouped by priority.  The priority number indicates the severity of the 
alert, i.e. priority 1 being the most severe.  For more detail on the alerts classification per 
week, please see Appendix C. 
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   Critical Classification (Priority 1)  
Classtype or name Brief Description
attempted-admin attempted administrator privilege gain
attempted-user attempted user privilege gain
shell-code-detect executable code was detected
successful-admin successful administrator privilege gain
successful-user successful user privilege gain
trojan-activity a network Trojan was detected
unsuccessful-user unsuccessful user privilege gain
web-application attack web application attack
   Intermediate Classification (Priority 2)  
Classtype or name Brief Description
attempted-dos attempted dos
attempted-recon attempted information leak
bad-unknown potentially bad traffic
denial-of-service detection of dos attack
misc-attack miscellaneous attack
non-standard-protocol detection of nonstandard protocol or event
rpc-portmap-decode decode of an RPD query
successful-dos denial of service
successful-recon-largescale large-scale information leak
successful-recon-limited information leak
suspicious-filename-detect a suspicious filename detected
suspicious-login an attempted login using a suspicious username was detected
system-call-detect a system call was detected
unusual-client-port-connection a client was using an unusual port
web-application-activity access to potentially vulnerable Web application
   Low-Risk Classification (Priority 3)  
Classtype or name Brief Description
icmp-event generic ICMP event
misc-activity miscellaneous activity
network-scan detection of network scan
not-suspicious not suspicious traffic
protocol-command-decode generic protocol command decode
string-detect a suspicious string was detected
unknown unknown traffic  
Table 6. Snort Alert Categories [5] 
 
Figure 9 shows the frequency of alerts generated in each classification for the 
collection period.  The most common classification with 65.8% is protocol-command-
decode.  These generated alerts or signatures are particular to NetBIOS Name Service, in 
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which packets are designated for NetBIOS TCP and UDP ports 135-139.  Our honeynet 
runs Windows 2000 Advanced Server and Windows XP where NetBIOS over TCP/IP is 
enabled.  With the numerous vulnerabilities associated with NetBIOS, we expect a high 
















































Figure 9.   Honeypot: Frequency of Classification 
 
Figures 10 and 11 show the frequency of alerts generated in each classification by 
week.  Figure 10 displays the major classifications that generated alerts per week.  
Despite the big spike in alerts with protocol-demand-code, we see a constant oscillation 
from week to week.  Figure 11 is the same graph with the protocol-command-code 
removed.  Classifications such as unsuccessful-user and network-scan remained constant 
throughout, while shellcode-detect and misc-attack showed an increase over time.  
Network-scan is part of the Internet noise that is constantly occurring.  Attacks that we 
are more concerned with and have higher priorities are the shellcode-detect and misc-
attack.  The shellcode-detect is a detection of an executable code.  There are numerous 
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malicious codes that spread through exploitation of vulnerable services.  Once these 
vulnerable services are known, we see an increase of malicious code targeting our 
honeynet. 









































Figure 10.   Honeypot: Alert Class Percentage over Time 
 
 











































3. Distribution of Signatures 
Seventy-eight different Snort alerts (signature matchings) were generated over the 
collection period.  The alerts can be grouped into Snort categories, as for example all 
ICMP signatures such as ICMP PING Windows, ICMP PING *NIX, ICMP trace route, 
etc. were grouped into the category of ICMP signatures.  Figure 12 shows the frequency 
of signature classes over our entire collection period.  The most common category are 
NETBIOS signatures.  We expect that with typical packet traffic there are certain alerts 
that occur more often than others.  


































Figure 12.   Honeypot:  Frequency of Alert Signature Category 
 
Figure 13 shows the individual frequency of alert-signature categories.  The 
percentage was calculated by totaling the alerts in a category and dividing by the total 
number of alerts that week.  Both MS-SQL and SHELLCODE signatures show an 
increase in alerts over the weeks.  ICMP and SNMP signatures show a significant spike 
in week 5 and then suddenly drop, suggesting they are due to different attackers than the 
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Figure 13.   Honeypot: Individual Frequency of Alert Signature Categories 
 
In our initial analysis, using only a 26 day period, we compared data from the first 
13 days with that of the last 13 days.  We use clustering to process each new alert by 
considering all identical alerts within a 10 minute or less as one single event.  Clusters 
greatly reduce the effect of one attacker repeatedly trying the same thing.  Table 7 shows 
raw alerts and clustered generated for each of the snort alert class.  As with the MS-SQL 
graph from Figure 13, we see an increase in raw alerts as well as an increase in clusters.  
Table 7 further breaks down the Web signatures.  We see that WEB-PHP alerts increase 
while WEB-IIS, WEB-ATTACKS, WEB-FRONTPAGE, and WEB-MISC decrease.  
The initial analysis is an indication that our honeypot and its vulnerabilities are being 
recognized and thus attack behavior is adjusting accordingly. 
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1/23 - 2/5 2/6 - 2/19







NETBIOS 11,491 451 38,100 463
BAD-TRAFFIC 1,854 409 2,274 418
MS-SQL 1,377 1,095 1,647 1,260
INFO 14 7 2,713 6
SHELLCODE 1,212 420 880 275
ICMP 545 124 952 121
WEB-PHP 104 12 215 22
WEB-CGI 98 25 97 25
WEB-IIS 19 16 135 9
WEB-ATTACKS 30 9 0 0
WEB-FRONTPAGE 4 2 0 0
WEB-MISC 15 7 2 2
SCAN 23 25 33 24
POLICY 14 13 19 17
EXPLOIT 20 4 3 3
SNMP 6 3 6 3
ATTACK-RESPONSES 1 1 0 0  
Table 7. Snort Alert Counts by Type Compared for Two Successive 13-day 
Periods.[14] 
 
B. SCHOOL NETWORK DATA ANALYSIS 
Collection of suspicious-event data from our school’s firewall was done March 2, 
2006 through March 18, 2006.  The alerts were collected daily and then accumulated. 
Only alerts from sensor 1 were collected, which sits outside the school’s firewall and 
captures all inbound/outbound traffic blocked or allowed by the firewall.  Alerts 
generated from sensor 1 will therefore capture any potential attacks. 
1. Distribution of Alerts 
a.  Alerts over Entire Collection Period 
We first show the distribution of alerts over the ten day period in a time 
plot.  Figure 14 represents all the generated alerts triggered and recorded by sensor 1 for a 




because the NPS Networking Group was still in the process of tuning their Snort sensor.  
In addition there were no alerts collected for the days of March 11th and 12th, and only 




































































Figure 14.   School: Time Plot of Distribution of Alerts 
 
b. Alerts by Hour 
In Figure 15, we display the number of alerts generated each hour for the 
ten-day period.  All alerts for the ten days were summed by the hour.  There are two 
meaningful spikes, one at 10:00 and one at 4:00 o’clock.  These suggest that most 
attackers are on Pacific Standard Time.   
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Distribution of Alerts By Hour











































Figure 15.   School: Alerts by Hour 
 
2. Distribution of Classification 
Figure 16 shows the distribution of classifications accumulated over the ten-week 
period.  Web-application-activity and bad-unknown are the most frequent occurring 




































































Figure 16.   School: Frequency of Alert Classification 
 
3.  Distribution of Signatures 
One-hundred and forty-two different alerts in 23 categories were generated over 
the collection period.  Figure 17 shows the distribution of alert (signature) categories.  
Since alerts are being generated by both inbound and outbound connections, we are 
seeing a variety of categories not witnessed in the honeypot data.  The frequency of 
signature categories is related to type of network and the users of this network.  In our 
case, the users of this network are students; therefore increased traffic is seen in WEB 
and INFO-FTP.  Other interesting signature categories include PORN and P2P.  P2P type 
signatures are software applications for peer-to-peer sharing of data.  Specifically, the 
School’s data shows signatures of popular two popular music sharing software, 
“Gnutella” and “Kazaa.”   
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Figure 17.   School: Frequency of Alert Signature Category 
 
C. COMPARISON OF HONEYPOT DATA TO REAL NETWORK DATA 
We did not see any significant similarities between the honeypot and the school’s 
firewall data.  This suggests that attackers recognize the two sites as quite different and 
use different attacks against each.  In fact, some categories seemed to be negatively 
correlated, suggesting that attackers are less likely to launch a particular attack on one 
site if they are already doing it on the other.  A notable missing category from the 
school’s data is NETBIOS.  Because of the large number of alerts generated in this 
category, the school chose to comment out the rule from their Snort configuration file, i.e. 
not to generate any alerts for incoming packets matching the NETBIOS rules.  Thus we 








V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
A. CONCLUSION  
In both the honeypot and school’s network, there is much randomness to the 
alerts.  Despite the noise, we did observe a definite decrease in the number of alerts on 
our honeypot over the weeks, and no decrease on the school’s firewall in some of the 
same time period.  It appears that after the tuning is complete on a honeypot and the 
deployment is stabilized, i.e. there is no missing data, that there will be a decrease in 
alerts.  We conclude that after the initial probing and reconnaissance is complete, the 
vulnerabilities of the honeypot are learned and therefore fewer alerts occur; but more 
specific signatures are then aimed at exploiting the honeypot.  Of course, the Networking 
Security Group is constantly monitoring their alerts; if vulnerabilities are found, the 
administrators quickly remedy this breach and therefore, there is stabilization with the 
number of alerts. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
A goal of this thesis was to develop a methodology for obtaining statistics about 
cyber-attack trends over time.  Therefore, future work should include running and 
monitoring of the honeynet system for a longer period of time.  In addition, as attackers, 
automated worms, botnets, and auto-rooters evolve, honeypot architecture must also 
evolve in its installation and configuration.  We must also anticipate that the honeynet’s 
IP address and its associated architecture, its operating system, and its services will be 
learned.  After sufficient data has been collected with the previous setup, a fresh and 
dissimilar architecture should be deployed.  Differences in architecture should include 
changes in the number of operating systems, types of operating systems, and types of 
services.  Again, this newer deployment should be monitored for a long period of time. 
Another goal of the thesis was to present a comparative analysis of the honeypot 
data with that of the School’s network data.  Much more can be extracted and compared, 
in particular because we had limited data from the School.  
Finally, we identify issues that could aid in the advancement of honeynet 
research:  
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1. Extract more metrics on alerts such as, IP source address, source and 
destination port numbers, time-to-live values, and types of protocols, and 
calculate statistics on these. 
2. Develop a more efficient way of automatically consolidating, clustering, 
and analyzing extracted data. 
3. Develop and implement methods to adjust the honeypot data with the 
School’s data in the same time period. 
4. Using different configurations, try to prove what clues attackers are 













APPENDIX A. STARTUP INSTRUCTIONS 
A. STEP-BY-STEP STARTUP INSTRUCTIONS 
These are the steps required to start the machines used in the experiments reported 
in this thesis.  First, the three computers must be powered on and connected per the 
Testbed Setup.  If computers are powered off, power on each computer (i.e. Router, 
Honeypot, and Data-Capture), boot into SuSE Linux 10.0, and log on. 
1. Instructions for Starting Honeypot Machine 
Once logged onto the Honeypot, perform these instructions to start VMware and 
power on the virtual honeynet environment. 
1)  Open terminal. 
2)  At prompt issue command: vmware. 
3)  Select Windows 2000 Advanced Server in the Favorites pane on the 
left of the workstation window.   
4)  Click on Power on this virtual machine. 
5)  Select Windows XP Professional 2 in the Favorites pane on the left of 
the workstation window. 
6)  Click on Power on this virtual machine. 
2. Instructions for Starting Data-Capture Machine 
Once logged onto the Data-Capture machine, perform these instructions to start 
PostgreSQL database server.  
1)  Open terminal. 
2)  Change directory by issuing command:  cd  /etc/init.d. 
3)  Start PostgreSQL by issuing command:  ./postgres start. 
(Optional)  These instructions allow users to log onto terminal-based front end to 
PostgreSQL.  Once logged in, users have the option to type in queries interactively to 
PostgreSQL and see the query results. 
 1)  Open terminal. 
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 2) Change directory by issuing command:   
  cd  /usr/local/postgres-8.1-1/bin/. 
 3) To login into database issue command:   
  ./psql –h  /var/tmp –U  <username> <name of database>. 
 4)  Type in appropriate password when prompted: <password>. 
3. Instructions for Starting Router Machine 
Once logged onto the Router, perform these instructions to download the latest 
rule set and start Snort 2.4.3. 
1)  Open terminal. 
2)  Change directory by issuing command:  cd  /etc/cron.daily. 
3)  Run oinkmaster script by issuing command:  ./oinkmaster. 
4)  Change directory by issuing command:  cd  /etc/rc.d. 
5)  Start Snort 2.4.3 by issuing command:  ./snort start. 
 (Optional)  These instructions allow users to remotely log onto terminal-based 
front-end to PostgreSQL.  Once logged in, users have the option to type in queries 
interactively, issue them to PostgreSQL, and see the query results. 
 1)  Open terminal 
 2)  Change directory by issuing command:   
  cd  /usr/local/postgres-8.1-1/bin/ 
 3)  To login into database issue command:   
  ./psql –h  10.0.0.10 –U  <username> <name of database> 
 4)  Type in appropriate password when prompted: <password> 
(Optional)  These instructions start Apache web server and Basic Analysis and 
Security Engine (BASE). 
 1)  Open terminal. 
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 2)  Change directory by issuing command:  cd  /etc/init.d. 
 3)  Start Apache web server by issuing command:  ./apache2 start. 
 4)  Open web browser. 
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APPENDIX B. DETAILS OF LAB EXPERIMENT 
A. ROUTER CONFIGURATION 
This section details scripts, files and directories associated with Snort 2.4.3, 
Apache webserver, BASE, and PostgreSQL.  Included with each section are the 
additional options of the startup scripts. 
1. Details of Necessary Files 
Name of File Location Description
*.rules /usr/local/snort/rules Text files of Snort rules
apache2 /etc/init.d Shell script to run Apache webserver
base_main.php /srv/www/htdocs/base Main web page of BASE
oinkmaster /etc/cron.daily
Shell script to read Oinkmaster 
configuration file, download latest ruleset, 
unpack and apply any changes to snort rule 
directory
oinkmaster.conf /etc/oinkmaster.conf Oinkmaster configuration file
oinkmaster.pl /usr/local/bin/
Original perl script to download latest 
ruleset, unpack and apply any changes; 
requires additional parameters, e.g. location 
of Oinkmaster configuration file and 
location of snort rules
psql /usr/local/postgres-8.1-1/bin
Executable for PostgreSQL interactive 
terminal
snort /usr/local/snort/bin Executable for Snort
snort.conf /usr/local/snort/rules Snort configuration file
snort.pl /etc/rc.d Script to start/restart/stop/reload Snort  
Table 8. Essential Files of the Router Machine 
 
2. Options and Details for Apache Script 
Other parameters can be passed to the Apache script.  Users must change 
directory to /etc/init.d and issue the following command, ./apache2, to view additional 
options.  The basic commands required to start and stop the webserver are as follows: 
• Start Apache:  ./apache2 start. 
• Stop Apache:  ./apache2 stop. 
3. Options and Details of Oinkmaster Script 
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For more information on using Oinkmaster, please reference, 
http://oinkmaster.sourceforge.net/.  The shell script located in /etc/cron.daily is the basic 
command to run the Oinkmaster Perl script.  The -o <directory> is a required argument.  
The downloaded files are compared to any existing rules in this directory before 
overwriting them.   
Oinkmaster Perl script: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
#!/bin/bash 
/usr/local/bin/oinkmaster.pl -o /usr/local/snort/rules/ 
/usr/bin/killall -HUP snort 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
4. Options and Details of PostgreSQL Interactive Terminal 
For additional instructions on accessing the PostgreSQL Interactive Terminal, 
please reference, http://www.postgresql.org/docs/8.1/static/tutorial-accessdb.html.  
Included in this section are the names of users and the database created for our lab 
experiment.   
One database was created.   
• Name of database: snortdb 
Two users were created. 
• Super user name: binh 
• User with write permission: snortadmin 
Example of command to remotely log into database: 
./psql –h  10.0.0.10 –U  snortadmin snortdb 
a. Sending Query Results to a File 
 In PostgreSQL Interactive Terminal, use the –o switch to send queries to a 
file.  When logged on from Router machine, follow the instructions provided below     
1)  Open terminal. 
2)  Change directory by issuing command:   
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 cd  /usr/local/postgres-8.1-1/bin. 
 3) Login into database issuing -o command:   
  ./psql -h 10.0.0.10 -U <username> <name of database> -o 
<name of file> 
 For example, 
  ./psql -h 10.0.0.10 -U binh snortdb -o '/root/data/query/test.txt' 
4)  Once logged in, type in query and results will output to specified file. 
This is an example of a query to obtain various information for a given day. 
SELECT event.timestamp, signature.sig_sid, signature.sig_priority, 
 signature.sig_name, signature.sig_class_id, sig_class.sig_class_name, 
 int8ip_to_str(iphdr.ip_src) as ipSrc, int8ip_to_str(iphdr.ip_dst) as ipDest, 
 iphdr.ip_ttl, iphdr.ip_proto as ipProtocol, event.cid as eventID 
FROM (event INNER JOIN iphdr ON event.cid = iphdr.cid) INNER JOIN 
 (sig_class INNER JOIN signature ON sig_class.sig_class_id = 
 signature.sig_class_id) ON event.signature = signature.sig_id 
WHERE (event.timestamp > '2006-03-09 23:59:24.912-08') AND    
(event.timestamp < '2006-03-11 00:00:02.194-08') AND (event.sid = iphdr.sid) 
ORDER BY event.timestamp ; 
 
5. Options and Details of Snort Script 
Other parameters can be passed to the Snort script.  Users must change directory 
to /etc/rc.d and issue the following commands to: 
• Start Snort:  ./snort start 
• Restart Snort:  ./snort restart 
• Stop Snort:  ./snort stop 
• Reload Snort:  ./snort reload 




case "$1" in 
 start) 












/usr/bin/killall -HUP snort 
;; 
*) 




B. DATA-CAPTURE CONFIGURATION 
This section details scripts, files and directories associated with PostgreSQL.  For 
additional instructions on starting the PostgreSQL database, please reference   
http://www.postgresql.org/docs/8.1/static/postmaster-start.html. 
1. Details of Necessary Files 
Name of File Location Description
pg_ctl /usr/local/postgres/bin
Starting the database server program; 
requires additional parameters
postgres.pl /etc/init.d
Script to start/restart/stop/reload 
PostgreSQL server program
postgresql.conf /var/pgdata/ Postgresql configuration file  
 Table 9. Essential Files of the Data-Capture Machine. 
 
2. Options and Details of PostgreSQL Script 
Other parameters can be passed to the PostgreSQL script.  Users must change 
directory to /etc/init.d and issue the following commands to: 
• Start PostgreSQL server:  ./postgres start 
• Restart PostgreSQL server:  ./postgres restart 
• Stop PostgreSQL server:  ./postgres stop 
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• Reload PostgreSQL server:  ./postgres reload 
The details of the PostgreSQL server script reads: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
#!/bin/bash 
case "$1" in 
 start) 
















 echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|reload}" 
        exit 1 
esac 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
C. HOW TO SETUP ODBC CONNECTION TO NPS NETWORK 
This section details how an ODBC connection was created to access the Snort 
data on the NPS network server.  We were granted read-only access to three separate 
databases: SnortCurrent, Snort8-30, and SnortStatistics.  Once logged into the NPS 
domain, we setup the connection from a Windows XP computer.  The instructions are as 
follows: 
1) Goto Control Panel-> Adminstrative Tools -> Data Sources (ODBC) 
2) From ODBC Data Source Adminstrator screen:  Add -> MS Access 
Database  
3) From New Data Source:  SQL Server -> Finish 
4) From Data Source to SQL Server: 
   Enter name: (e.g. SnortCurrent) 
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   Enter Server: 172.20.48.54 -> Next 
5) Enable 'With SQL Server authentication using login ID and password entered 
by the user’ 
   Enter Login ID:  <username> 
   Enter password:  <password> 
(NOTE: Request access to database server and verify server ip address with 
NPS Network Security Group) 
6)  Click on Client Configuration button 
7) From Edit Network Library Configuration: 
   Select: TCP/IP 
   Server name: 172.20.48.54 
   Port number: 2433 
8) Test connection -> Okay 





















APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL GRAPHS 
A. HONEYPOT CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS 
This details the occurrence of an alert by its classification by day for each of the 
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Figure 24.   Honeypot Classification: Mar.05 – Mar. 11 
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